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PREFACE 
The aid given to some developing countries often has 
conditions attached. This is particularly true in the case of 
food aid. These conditions are often referred to in the litera- 
ture as tied aid. This paper analyses various tying techniques. 
It estimates the type of losses which ensue and some of the 
strategies that may be adopted by the recipients. 
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The Welfare Costs of Tied Food Aid 
bs 
Phi l ip  C. Abbott and F. Desmond McCsrthy 
It is now generally understood t h a t  aid-tying, whether by 
1/ 
source o r  project,  imposes an excess cost when the  tying i s  effective.- 
However, the  analysis of such res t r i c t ions  has not been integreted in to  
a general equilibrium framework i n  the  developmental l i t e ra tu re .  Hence, 
it is insuff ic ient ly  appreciated t h a t  the  problen of assessing t h e  benefi ts  
(and possibly losses)  from the  receipt  of t i e d  a id  i s  essent ia l ly  one of 
2/ 
constrained maximization .- 
The inadequacy i s  par t icular ly  evident i n  the analysis of 
P.L. 480 aid. The c lass ic  a r t i c l e s  by Schultz (1960) and Fisher (1963) 
focussed exclusively on the  impact of P.L. 480 a id  on domestic food 
production. On the  other hand, even i f  such an ef fec t  were present, 
the welfare *act of t h e  receipt  of food a id  could be positive. It i s  
the purpose of t h i s  note t o  develop the  analysis of t h e  l a t t e r  question 
systematically. 
In doing t h i s ,  we note t h a t  P.L. 480 a id  comes t o  a country 
not en t i r e ly  as a grant. The constraints  posed by the  food a id  (vis-a-vis 
Philip C. Abbott is with the Department of Economics, Northeastern Univer- 
sity, F. Desmond McCarthy is with the International Institute for Applied 
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria. The authors wish to acknowledge the 
helpful suggestions of Professors J.N. Bhagwati and L. Taylor of M.I.T. 
1/ For the  project-tying, see  Singer (19651, f o r  source ty icg  see Haq 
(1965) and Bhagwati (1968). 
2/ Hovever, the  general equilibrium approach has e a r l i e r  been devel- 
oped i n  the  trade-tfieoretic, a s  d i s t i n c t  from the  developmental 
l i t e r a t u r e ,  by 3hagwati (1968). 
cash a i d )  may r e l a t e  t o  d m e s t i c  consumption o r  production o r  imports -- 
and t h a t  t h e  l o s s  r e s u l t i n g  *om meeting such cons t r a in t s  nay not be t h e  
minimal one, s ince  second-best p o l i c i e s  may be u t i l i z e d  t o  meet t h e  
constra ints .  
We u t i l i z e  t h e  usual t rade- theoret ic  model, which assumes 
two t r sdab le s  (one being food) and f ixed  in t e rna t iona l  po l i c i e s ,  with 
t h e  food a i d  then cons t i t u t ing  a " t ransfer"  rece ip t .  The key d i f fe rence  
fPcnn standard t rade- theoret ic  ana lys i s  i s  t h a t  t h e  post- t ransfer  equil-  
ibrium must r e r l e c t  t h e  addi t iona l  cons t r a in t s  t h a t  P.L. 480 a i d  leg is -  
3 / l a t i o n  may r eau i r e  .- 
Vhile each cons t ra in t  w i l l  be t r e a t e d  diagrammatically, we 
a l s o  analyze it a lgebra ica l ly .  The nota t ion  used f o r  t h e  l a t t e r  w i l l  
be as follows: 
Ci : Domestic c o n s ~ t i o n  of good i = 1,2  i ' 
Yi : Domestic productian of good i = 1,2 i ' 
A : Aid received, i n  t h e  form o f  good 1 
p : World Market P r i c e  of good 1 denominated i n  terms of 
good 2 
U ( c ~ ,  c2) : Soc ia l  U t i l i t y  Function 
F (Y1, y2) : Reduction P o s s i b i l i t y  R o n t i e r  
1 - a : Grant ccmponent of  a id .  
Hence, t h e r e  a r e  two goods i n  t h i s  vor ld ,  t h e  a i d  good 1 (food) and all 
3 / The usual t r a n s f e r  problem ana lys i s ,  of course, is a l s o  of 
i n t e r e s t  when t h e  terms of t r a d e  caD vary. E3y cont ras t ,  w e  a r e  
assuming here t h a t  t h e  terms of  t r a d e  a r e  f ixed,  s ince  a i d  re- 
c ip i en t s  genera l ly  meet t h e  requirements of t h e  s m a l l  country 
assumption. 
0th- goods. It is  assumed tha t  U (cl, C2)  and P (Y1, Y 2 )  satisf'y 
conditions f o r  d i f f e r e n t i a l b i l i t y  a s  required, and U and Fi denote i 
p a r t i a l  derivatives with respect t o  Ci and Yi, respectively. Throughout 
t h e  analysis non-specialization i n  consumption and production w i l l  be 
assumed, and trade is  allowed, except when specif ic  constraints  a re  intro- 
duced. We w i l l  therefore be concerned only wikh i n t e r i o r  maxima. 
I. Consumption Constraint 
It is assumed t h a t  pr ior  t o  receiving aid, t h e  recipient  country, 
a small, open economy;' maximizes its soc ia l  u t i l i t y  U and this r e s u l t s  i n  
a level  of consumption q f o r  t h e  a id  gwd. After receiving aid,  t h e  
- 
consumption l eve l  of good 1 i s  constrained t o  be C1 = C1 + A. (This 
1s the  constraint  of " a d d i t i a a l i t ~ ~  which is  often thought t o  be applied 
In US P.L. 480 donations.) I n  addition, t h e  country now seeks t o  max- 
imize U subject t o  t h i s  constraint and a lso  t h e  production and foreign 
exchange constraints.  The problem faced by t h i s  country can, therefore,  
be specified as  f o l l m :  
Hlu u (C1, c2) 
s.t. F (yl, y2) = 0 
Social U t i l i t y  
Production Poss ib i l i ty  
Frontier  
p. [cl - (1 - + Cp - Y:, = 0 Foreign Exchange Constant 
Additionality Constraint 
A geometric interpretat ion of t h e  problem i s  given i n  Fig. 1. 
4/ This implies t h a t  i t s  behavior does not e f fec t  p, t h e  world price -
of good 1. 
a 
a 
Good 2 
(all other 
Goods) 
Figure 1. Consumption Constraint on 
Aid Recipient 
Good 1 
(Food) 
I n i t i a l  production is  a t  P and consum-ption a t  C ,  giving maximum u t i l i t y  
U1. A.fter the  inf lux of a id  t h e  grant cagonent  moves t h e  foreign ex- 
change constraint t o  albl 'yielding t h e  primary gain. If one now imboses 
- 
the  addit ional i ty constraint  C1 = C1 + A then a solution must also 
l i e  on the  l i n e  ed. The opthum outcome f o r  t h e  case i l l u s t r a t e d  (with 
a )  0) is a t  s where t h e  u t i l i t y  i s  below pre-aid l eve l  U1. A primary 
gcrin moves ab t o  a'b"and then t h e  concomitant loss  occurs due t o  t h e  
binding consumption d is tor t ion .  It is evident t h a t  i f  t h e  consumption 
constraint were not binding a gain would resu l t ;  a s  a'b'passes above 
U f o r  same portion of t h a t  curve. It should a l so  be noted t h a t  t h e  1 
outvard s h i f t  of t h e  budget constraint  a'b' i s  determined by a . If 
a = 0, a'b' s h i f t s  by an amount A, and so C: equals Cpprior t o  t h e  a id  
transfer.  In t h a t  case, no loss  occurs. If a exceeds 0, however, then 
a'b' s h i f t s  out by an amount l e s s  than A, so t h a t  C2 i s  reduced and a 
loss  i n  u t i l i t y  may result. In  t h e  extreme case where a =  1, then ab 
does not s h i f t ,  and a l o s s  is obvious. 
The optimum solut ion under t h e  consumption addi t ional i ty  
constraint may a l so  be obtained analyt ical ly.  The change i n  soc ia l  u t i -  
Uty, du, obtained i s  given by: 
(see appendix 1 f o r  t h e  derivation ; the  case where the  addition- 
U t y  constraint i s  not binding i s  a l so  t rea ted  there)  
If t h e  addi t ional i ty  constraint i s  binding, then it follows 
tha t  dC1 = dA. Production i s  kept at the optimum by maintaining the  
pre-aid prices t o  t h e  producer. A consumption t a x  cum subsidy i s  reauired 
t o  insure consmption a t  s ( ~ i g .  1,) .  The change i n  U i s  given by: 
dU = UldA - a pU2dA 
also: 
u1 ' pU2 - A3 
so tha t :  
dU ((1 - o ) pU2 - X 3  ) dA 
where X can be thought of a s  t h e  shadow pr ice  of the  addi t ional i ty  3 
constraint.  Since CI is fixed, t h e  other  constraints and first order 
conditions a lso  f i x  C2. U1 and U2 are evaluated a t  t h i s  point,  where 
U = U (q + A, c2). Note t h a t  when t h e  addit ional i ty constraint did 
not apply, optimality conditions required tha t  t h e  country always gain, 
The constrained solut ion,  however, allows Up> U1/p which is why the  country 
may lose, One should note that i n  Fig, 1, t h e  soc ia l  u t i l i t y  function 
is no longer tangent t o  t h e  budget constraint  ( l i n e  a%'' ) a t  point s,  
t h e  constrained outcome, 
Some observations a r e  relevant a t  t h i s  juncture, The above 
conditions imply t h a t  if a country is  following optimal production policy, 
pr ice  t o  farmers w i l l  not equal pr ices  to consumers. This occurs because 
of t h e  presence of a ire resource - t h e  food aid, This i s  then allocated 
between farmers and consumers by appropriate prices t o  each, !he a id  
inflow w i l l  be used t o  subsidize lower food prices t o  consumers (and in 
e f fec t ,  higher food pr ices  t o  producers than would otherwise obtain).  
Hence, the  constraints  considered here do not necessarily impose the  
Schultzian d i s incen t ive  e f f ec t .  Hence, i f  appropria te  po l icy  i s  followed 
the re  w i l l  not be  any change i n  domestic production. By use of an 
appropria te  wedge, incen t ive  t o  produce i s  not reduced, s i nce  t h e  pro- 
ducer faces  t h e  same (pre-aid) r e l a t i v e  pr ices .  Thus, a c o n s m t i o n  
ex t e rna l i t y  is  b e s t  handled by a consumtion po l icy  of tax and subsidy. 
11. Production Constraint:  
It is assumed here  t h a t  the  r ec ip i en t  is required by the  
a i d  donor t o  produce an  add i t i ona l  amount of the  a i d  good 1 
equal t o  811 above the  pre-aid level of TI. The problem may be 
s t a t e d  a s  follows: 
Max U(C1? C2) Social  U t i l i t y  
Production P o s s i b i l i t y  
Front ie r  
P [cl - ( 1  - a)A - Y1) + C2 - Y 2  - 0 Foreign Exchange Constraint  
Y - 7  + B A  Production Constraint  
Again a geometric i n t e rp re t a t i on  is  shown i n  Fig. 2. Before 
a i d  one is  constrained by the  world market t o  ab with a i d  good 
production a t  5. I f  production of good 1 is now forced t o  !fl + 3 A 
the  r e su l t i ng  fo re ign  exchange cons t r a in t  i s  a b. The primary ga in  
from the  a id  w i l l  move a'b'nut by an amount ( 1  - a)A t t~  a' b'. 
One should a l s o  note  t h a t  a country constrained to  produce a t  the  
Same l e v e l  a s  before  r ece ip t  of t h e  a i d  ( i .e . . ,  3 = 0) w i l l  always 
g a i n  from t h e  a i d  inflow, though t h e  v a l u e  of t h a t  a i d  is reduced by 
t h e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  c o n s t r a i n t .  
Also, i f  t h e  a i d  is a l l  g r a n t ,  then  a country  w i l l  g a i n  once B 
is less than  u n i t y .  For t h i s  c o n s t r a i n t  t h e  domestic food production 
(good 1) i n c r e a s e s .  The optimum (second bes t )  p o l i c y  r e q u i r e s  a pro- 
ducer t a x  cum subsidy.  Such changes i n  production r e q u i r e  advance 
n o t i c e  of t h e  a i d  a v a i l a b i l i t y ,  however. 
Good 2 
(all other 
Goods) 
1 (Food) 
Figure 2. Production Constraint 
111. Import Constraint 
In t h i s  instance t h e  country is  required t o  lmport some given 
amount of food. This may a r i s e  where business i n t e r e s t s  i n  t h e  donor 
country seek t o  i n s i s t  on t h e  recipients  of t h e i r  c m e r c i a l  i m ~ o r t s  
continuing those commercial imports o r  a t  l e a s t  some specif ied f rac t ion  
of t h e  pre-aid level  of comrmercial inqorts.  The problem may be stated: 
Social U t i l i t y  
Production Poss ib i l i ty  
Frontier  
Foreign Exchange Constraint 
Import Constraint 
The mathematical solut ion obtained f o l l a r s  along similar l i n e s  t o  I and 
11. (see appendix 3 f o r  de ta i l s . )  Results again indica te  t h a t  constraints 
came with a cost ,  and a severe enough constraint may induce a loss  from 
the  receipt  of t i e d  aid.  
A similar problem has been analyzed by Bhagwati (1968) f o r  t h e  
case y = 1. This is shown in Fig. 3 and it i l l u s t r a t e s  t h e  points out- 
l ined  i n  Appendix 3. I n f t i a l  production and consumption a r e  a t  Y1 and 
C1 giving u t i l i t y  $. For food a i d  A and no constraints  consumption i s  
at C1 ~ i v i n g  u2. I f  t h e  recipient is n m  constrained t o  imports a t  t h e  
pre-aid l eve l  ( y = 1 ) i n  addition t o  t h e  aid A then one possible solution 
is t o  consume a t  C1 yielding u t i l i t y  $. This nay be real ized by a con- 
sumption tax  cum subsidy. This would, however, be an ineff ic ient  policy. 
The recipient  could a l s o s a t i s f y  t h e  constraint  and do b e t t e r  i f  consump- 
* * 
t i o n  were a t  Cl yielding U . TO achieve t h i s  l eve l ,  U (higher than $) 
* 
requires producing a t  Y1. 
Thus, t o  achieve t h e  optimum solution (under the  imaosed pattern 
of t r ade ) ,  the  rec ip ient  is  obliged t o  in te r fe re  i n  both consumption and 
production markets. This requires a production t a x  cum subsidy t o  drive 
* 
production t o  Y1, lowering t h e  re la t ive  food price t o  t h e  producer to- 
* 
gether with a consumption t a x  cum subsidy t o  drive consumption t o  Cl 
1) (assuming t h a t  t h e  associated U i s  t h e  maximum tha t  can be achieved). 
The two taxes should be eaual f o r  a lowest cost solution. This 
point iras not highlighted by Bhagwati. Analytical d e t a i l s  a re  given i n  
Appendix 3. It is noted i n  this instance t h a t  t h e  Import constraint 
resul t s  i n  the  recipient  producing less food domestically than i n  t h e  
pre-aid s i tua t ion  by making food production l e s s  a t t rac t ive .  Hence, 
the  Schultzian, disincentive ef fec t  is  operating i n  . th is  case. 
Good 2 
(all other 
Goods) 
F i q u r e  3 .  Impor t  C o n s t r a i n t  on  Aid 
R e c i p i e n t  
Good 1, ( Food) 
IV .  D i s t r i b u t i o n a l  E f f e c t s  
I n  t h i s  s e c t i o n  t h e  model is modified t o  ana lyze  t h e  e f f e c t s  
on a c o u n t r y ' s  w e l f a r e  when a l l  i n d i v i d u a l s  {wi th in  t h e  country  a r e  
n o t  t h e  same. I n  o r d e r  t o  focus  on t h i s  a s p e c t  of t h e  problem i t  
is assumed t h a t  t h e  country  consumes a l l  t h e  o u t p u t  and a l s o  any 
a i d .  The u s u a l  c a v e a t s  about  normative u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  apply .  
The a n a l y s i s  o f  the  e f f e c t s  i s  based on a  model of a country  
wi th  two c l a s s e s  of w r k e r .  The L1 members of t h e  f i r s t  produce 
only  food (Goodl) w h i l e  t h e  L2 members of t h e  o t h e r  produce only 
machines (Good 2). These may b e  t y p i c a l l y  r u r a l  and urban popu- 
l a t i o n s .  Each c l a s s ,  i, consumes bo th  goods, I n d i v i d u a l s  have 
i 
u t i l i t y  f u n c t i o n s  U (clip CZi), i - 1 , 2  where C is t h e  q u a n t i t y  j i  
of food j consumed by a  member of  c l a s s  i and C j - Cjl + Cj2'  I =  
1,2 .  The p roduc t ion  func t ions  are assumed t o  have t h e  form: 
w i t h  t h e  u s u a l  p r o p e r t i e s .  A s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  func t ion  U f o r  t h e  
country  is assumed of t h e  form: 
Before food a i d  a r r i v e s  i t  is assumed t h a t  a  g e n e r a l  e q u i l i -  
brium exists w i t h  a l l  markets i n  equ i l ib r ium and a l l  income consumed. 
Let a  q u a n t i t y  dA of food a i d  a r r i v e  i n  t h e  country ;  t h e  ques- 
t i o n  of how i t  is d i s t r i b u t e d  is discussed l a t e r .  It is assumed t h a t  
s t r u c t u r a l  r i g i d i t y  of t h e  economy is such t h a t  workers cannot  change 
from prdoucing one  good t o  another  s o  t h a t  t h e  p h y s i c a l  ou tpu t  of 
goods remains t h e  same. (This d i s t o r t i o n  is necessary  t o  make com- 
modity ty ing  of t h e  a i d  important .  Otherwise, s h i f t s  of l a b o r  between 
occupat ions  w i l l  m i t i g a t e  t h e  r e d i s t r i b u t i v e  e f f e c t s  of t h e  a i d  t rans-  
f e r ) .  However, t h e  money wage of workers i n  food w i l l  t y p i c a l l y  
f a l l ,  i n  e f f e c t  reducing t h e i r  a b i l i t y  t o  t r a d e  f o r  o t h e r  goods. 
It is assumed t h a t  a l l  f a c e  t h e  same p r i c e  f o r  food p, wi th  the  
p r i c e  f o r  machines being 1. 
The change i n  u t i l i t y  f o r  a member of c l a s s  i is given by 
The change i n  u t i l i t y  f o r  t h e  country is given by: 
It is of i n t e r e s t  t o  examine when du may be nega t ive  ( i . e . ,  t h e  
aid induces a n e t  l o s s  i n  s o c i a l  u t i l i t y ) .  (The d e t a i l s  a r e  given 
i n  Appendlx 4 . )  
The a n a l y s i s  sugges t s  t h a t  s u f f i c i e n t  cond i t ions  t o  produce a 
net l o s s  i n  s o c i a l  u t i l i t y  a r e :  
(a) The d i s t r i b u t i o n  of food a i d  t o  t h e  food producing 
c l a s s  does not  outweigh its l o s s  i n  marketed su rp lus .  
(b) The marginal  u t i l i t y  of  food (machines) of t h e  food 
producers is s u f f i c i e n t l y  h igher  than t h a t  of t h e  
machine producers.  
( c )  Factor  markets a r e  r i g i d  so  t h a t  food producers w i l l  
not  s h i f t  t o  producing machines. 
The typica l  s i tua t ion  where one might ant ic ipa te  such a r e su l t  
would be a country receiving food a i d  when a la rge  segment of i ts  pop- 
ulat ion i s  involved i n  agriculture.  
The optimum (second bes t )  policy i n  t h i s  instance necessi tates  
a redis t r ibut ive  mechanism. This would require different  consumption 
and production t a x  cum subsidy fo r  each class.  
V. Conclusions 
The analyses of constraints  placed on US P.L. 480 food a id  pre- 
8ented here have shown t h a t  the  value of t h a t  aid t o  a recipient  country 
can be sharply reduced and may i n  f a c t  r e su l t  i n  a net l o s s  i f  t h a t  a id  
is accompanied by su f f i c i en t ly  severe constraints.  
The results are summn-rized i n  Table 1 f o r  t h e  pa r t i cu la r  models 
discussed. In  addition, if t h e  a id  causes sharp redis t r ibut ional  e f fec ts ,  
then the  net soc ia l  u t i l i t y  of an aid receiving country may a lso  decrease. 
These resu l t s  follow from t h e  e f fec t s  of d is tor t ions  i n  al locat ions of 
renources i n  the  receiving country a s  a r e su l t  of t h e  constraint  which 
accmpanies the  aid. 
Further, it is a l so  important t o  r ea l i ze  t h a t  a recipient  may 
meet these constraints  i n  a number of ways, and f o r  each s i tua t ion  there  
is  an optimum (second bes t )  policy. The departure from unified exchagge 
ra tes  requires act ive government par t ic ipa t ion  t o  minimize t h e  loss.  
The lessons from US food aid, which was considered exp l i c i t ly  
here, can be eas i ly  extended t o  other  forms of a id  which come with s t r ings  
attached. Hence, one should not assume t h a t  a id  with conditions attached 
w i l l  benefit a recipient,  and even i f  there i s  benefit ,  the  real  value 
of the aid t o  a recipient rnw well be less than its nominal value. 
Table 1. 
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS OR RECIPIENT 
AID KITH CO~JSTRAINTS A'T'TAo OR WHEN MA~DISTRIBUTIOR MISTS ( & j  
Cause of Loss Optimum Can net loss Post Aid (second best) occur if aid Domestic 
Policy is all grant! food production 
1. Consumption I Consumption ti0 additional it^ Tax cum subsidy Unchanged 
2. Domestic I Production YES If 
Production 
Incre~se 
T1 = Y i  + ' B A  
3- Import Level 
Maintenance 
Tax cum subsidy 
Equal 
Consumption and NO 
Production tax 
cum subsidy 
C1 
b. Maldistribution 
of purchasing 
pover 
Different YES 
Consumption and 
Production tax 
cum subsidy 
for each 
class 
Increase 
Decrease 
Unchanged 
( short-run ) 
*Note: for 1,2 and 3 it is assumed that no distribution problems exist, 
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Appendix 1 Optimum p o l i c y  f o r  a n  a i d  r e c i p i e n t  under  a consumption 
a d d i t i o n  c o n s t r a i n t  
Consider Lagfangian  m u l t i p l i e r s  X i= 1 , 2 , 3  f o r  t h e s e  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  i 
t h e  problem becomest 
MZUC u(cl, c 2 )  + ) . l ~ ( ~ l y  Y2) + A ~ [ P ( c ~  - (1 - a)A - Y ) + C - Y ] ,  
- 
1 2 2 
+ 3 ( C 1  - C 1  - A) 
F i r s t  o r d e r  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  problem a r e :  
p l u s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s  
Using t h e s e  f o u r  c o n d i t i o n s  t o g e t h e r  w i t h  t h e  t h r e e  c o n s t r a i n t  
c o n d i t i o n s ,  one may e v a l u a t e  t h e  seven unknowns: C1, C2, Y1, Y 2 ,  
X l  Y x, a3 
The change of U 
Note a lso  tha t :  
dU = UldC1 + u L -pdC1 + ( 1 - a 1 w] 
It is now of i n t e r e s t  t o  analyze t h e  various poss ib l i t ies .  I f  t h e  
"additionality" constraint  i s  not binding then f o r  a maximum U one has 
= 0 and so U1 = U2. Thie yields: 3 
In t h i s  instance a country always gains by accepting a id  
(0 1_ a < 1). Hence, t h e  requirement t h a t  some of an a i d  good be paid 
for  cannot, by itself, induce a l o s s  i n  this instance. 
Appendix 2. Optimum Policy for an a i d  recipient under a production 
Constraint. 
For t h i s  instance the problem is: 
U(C1. C p )  + AIF(Y1. Y2) + A2(p(c1 - (1 - a )A - Y1 + C2)  
+ ?, y 1  - (Tl + B A )  ) 
First  order conditions f'rm the analgtic formulation are: 
plus the original  constraints. 
Change i n  u t i l i t y  i s  given by; 
dU U l  dCl + U2dC2 
Noting tha t :  
dC2 = -pdC1 + (1 - a) pdA + pdYl + dY2 
one may e v a l u a t e  t h e  v a r i o u s  subcases.  
If t h e  c o n s t r a i n t  on product ion is  n o t  binding,  then 
A 3  = 0 ,  F 1  = pF2 and U1 = pU2 
This  y ie lds :  
a s  before .  
That is, product ion is allowed t o  remain a t  po in t  D i n  
Figure  2, which is t h e  optimum p o i n t ,  s o  t h a t  t h e  primary g a i n  
from a i d  w i l l  be a l l  t h a t  occurs .  
If c o n s t r a i n t  is binding,  however, then p = 1% and dU 
becomes 
a l s o  
and 
This  y i e l d s  
dU = U 1  [ ( I  - ,) pdA -63dA 
Note t h a t  f o r  a =  1 ( a l l  ' a i d '  paid f o r )  dU< 0. This  i s  
s imply  t h a t  a  b ind ing  product ion  c o n s t r a i n t  w i l l  produce a  l o s s ,  
s i n c e  i t  moves t h e  r e c i p i e n t  from t h e  op t ima l  prodcut ion  p o i n t  D. 
For a = 0 ,  (no payment f o r  a i d )  g a i n  ( l o s s )  r e q u i r e s  p - 68  
t o  be  p o s i t i v e  ( n e g a t i v e ) ,  This  says t h a t  a r e c i p i e n t  of comple te ly  
"free" a i d  may i n c u r  a l o s s  i f  t h a t  a i d  i s  t i e d  t o  a  s u f f i c i e n t l y  
r e s t r i c t i v e  p roduc t ion  c o n s t r a i n t ,  
Appendix 3 Optimum P o l i c y  f o r  a n  a i d  Rec ip ien t  under 
an Import Cons t r a i n  t 
I n  t h i s  i n s t a n c e ,  the problem faced  by t h e  r e c i p i e n t  coun t ry  is: 
Max U(C1, C2)  + %IF( Y 1 ,  Y2) + A2(p(C1 - (1- a)A-Y1) + C 2  - Y 2 )  
+ (Cl Y1 - 7 (El - T I )  + A) 
F i r s t  o rde r  c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  t h i s  problan  a r e :  
uy + A ~ P  + % = 0 
u2  + A2 = o  
A 1  F, - A2P - A 3  - 0  
1 2  - A2 = 0 
p l u s  t h e  o r i g i n a l  c o n s t r a i n t s ,  Using t h e s e  c o n d i t i o n s ,  one may 
e v a l u a t e  t h e  seven  unknowns; C 1, C2,  Y 1, Y 2 ,  A1, X 2 ,  and X3. 
S i n c e  t h e  change i n  u t i l i t y  is given  by 
aa& from the above conditions: 
l?&e t h a t  f o r  an optimum (lowest c o s t )  soll:tion production and world 
p r i ce s  shoald be separated by an amount - ' while consum~tion and world 
-1 3 U2 3 pr ices  should be separated by -. This t a x  package toge ther  with an 
u2 
appropriate subsidy y i e l d s  t h e  optimum (second bes t  ) solut ion.  
dU Once again, i f  the  cons t r a in t  is not  binding, i3 = 0 an11 - dA 
dU 
reduces t o  - = U 2 ( 1  - a ) p  = (1 - a ) U 1  dA 
However, with t h e  cons t ra in t ,  changes i n  production (dY ) a r e  
induced, and t h i s  can counteract  t h e  primary gain from t h e  a i d  
I n  t h a t  caset  
Again, h 3 i s  in te rpre ted  a s  t h e  cos t  of t h e  cons t ra in t ,  and its 
value can be calculated from the  f i r s t  order conditions discussed 
earlier. Those conditions and, hence, t h e  cons t ra in t ,  a lsotmply a 
re la t ionsh ip  between dA ( the a id  inflow) and dY , t h e  induced change 
i n  production. 
Appendix 4 The d i s t r i b u t i o n  e f f e c t  f o r  an  a i d  r e c i p i e n t  
I n  t h e  t e x t  i t  i s  shown t h a t  t h e  change i n  u t i l i t y f o r  
a  two c l a s s  s o c i e t y  a f t e r  r ece iv ing  a i d  is given by dU where 
dU a LldU1 + L2dU2 
It is of i n t e r e s t  t o  cons ide r  a  number of cases .  
E g a l i t a r i a n  Soc ie ty  
If one makes a  common assumption t h a t  a l l  members of t h e  
s o c i e t y  have s i m i l a r  marginal  u t i l i t y  ( f o r  each good) i .e.,  
then i t  fo l lows tha t :  
s i n c e  t h e  n e t  i n c r e a s e  i n  food consumption i s  dA w h i l e  t h e  
n e t  i n c r e a s e  i n  machine consumption i s  zero one ob ta ins :  
dU = l J i p d ~  > 0 
Accordingly one concludes t h a t  a n  e g a l i t a r i a n  s o c i e t y  w i l l  
i n c r e a s e  i t s  w e l f a r e  by acqu i r ing  a i d .  
I n  many c o u n t r i e s  t h e r e  is a  sha rp  d i f f e r e n c e  between v a r i o u s  
c l a s s e s  t h i s  may b e  viewed a s  a  d i f f e r e n c e  i n  marginal  u t i l i t y  
between, say ,  a  r u r a l  food producing and an  urban machine producing 
c l a s s .  Consider t h i s  somewhat more genera l  s i t u a t i o n .  The change 
i n  t h e  coun t ry ' s  u t i l i t y  dU is given by 
Noting tha t :  
one ob ta ins :  
The ques t ion  i s  then whether dU can be negat ive .  The second term 
w i l l  be p o s i t i v e .  I t  remains t o  analyze  t h e  f i r s t  term. For a 
1 
t y p i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  U l  - can be < 0 .  This occurs  when c l a s s e s  
have d i f f e r e n t  t a s t e  b u t  s i m i l a r  endowments, o r  s i m i l a r  t a s t e s  
wi th  d i f f e r e n t  endowments, o r  both. The changes i n  wages (money) 
f o r  members of Class 1, dU , is given by: 
where f  i s  t h e  f r a c t i o n  of food a i d  given t o  c l a s s  1 and da is 1 
a i d / c a p i t a  i n  c l a s s  1. Since  each consumes t o t a l  income one a l s o  
o b t a i n s  ( ignor ing  2nd o rder  e f f e c t s ) ;  
Hence , 
C 1  
PldCll + dCZ1 - Ap - CllAp + pda 
- ( - C l l )  Ap + pda 
L1 
This l a s t  term I s  t h e  d i f f e r e n c e  between t h e  marketed s u r p l u s  
of  a  c l a s s  one member (a  l o s s )  and t h e  va lue  of t h e  food a i d  
received (ga in ) .  Thus t h e  n e t  e f f e c t  can be negat ive  - and s o  a 
n e t  welfare  l o s s  can r e s u l t  t o  c l a s s  1. I f  i n  a d d i t i o n  lJ1 - U: 
1 
is s u f f i c i e n t l y  n e g a t i v e  then one o b t a i n s  t h e  r e s u l t  t h a t  dU 
can be negat ive ,  i .e.,  t h e  country  a s  a whole l o s e s  by 
